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Abstract
Does self-insurance, such as access to savings or assets, affect support for govern-
ment? While existing research recognizes that households’ ability to privately 
manage income risk and economic uncertainty influences voter redistributive pref-
erences, we know relatively little about how self-insurance affects evaluations of 
government in the first place. To gain traction on this question, we combine cross-
sectional and panel public opinion surveys from 28 countries in Central Eastern 
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia with macro-data on economic performance. 
Exploiting variation in citizen responses to the Great Recession, we show that by 
enabling citizens to smooth consumption, self-insurance affects how they form 
economic perceptions. Moreover, we find that self-insurance bolsters support for 
incumbents. Results allow us to better understand why economic downturns may not 
dampen support for government, even when economic hardship is rife and access to 
public safety nets is limited.
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Introduction
In the past decades the cost of protecting against income risks has largely shifted 
from society as a whole to individuals (Brooks 2009; World Bank 2011). Trends 
toward privatization, austerity, and fiscal constraints have encouraged poorer and 
richer households around the world to engage in self-insuring behaviours (Brooks 
2014; Gill and Ilahi 2000; Ehrlich and Becker 1972; Carroll 1997).1 By accumu-
lating precautionary savings, investing in risk-hedging assets, and ensuring access 
to monetary and non-monetary help from friends and family at home or abroad, 
households aim to insure against economic risk and compensate for income loss in 
the event of an economic downturn. It is estimated that in 2007–2009 alone pre-
cautionary savings, that is savings set aside in response to news about the loom-
ing recession, accounted for at least two-fifths of the increase in household saving 
rates (Mody et al. 2012). Self-insurance also enabled many households to smooth 
consumption, especially in regions where access to state-funded safety nets was lim-
ited. For example, in the South Caucasus, where just seven per cent of crisis-affected 
citizens had access to state-provided insurance, one in two households actively 
relied on private safety nets in order to compensate for income loss during the Great 
Recession (EBRD 2011).
The contemporary importance of self-insurance, commonly defined as the actions 
taken by individuals or households in order to reduce the size of economic uncer-
tainty, or of a potential income loss (Ehrlich and Becker 1972), has reinvigorated 
scholarly interest in the political consequences of households’ risk-management 
decisions. While existing research recognizes self-insurance effects on voter welfare, 
redistributive preferences (Ansell 2014; Doyle 2015; Hacker et al. 2013; Rehm et al. 
2012) and political engagement (Escribà-Folch et al. 2015; Brooks 2014; McMann 
2006), we know relatively little about how private safety nets affect attitudes towards 
government in the first place. Could households’ ability to manage economic risk 
and uncertainty affect not only what citizens want from government, but also how 
they evaluate the government to be performing in the first place? To put this point 
in starker terms, consider a hypothetical case of two otherwise similar individuals, 
one with and the other without access to self-insurance, in the form of precaution-
ary savings for example. The question that arises then is whether a deterioration in 
economic conditions will have the same effect on these two individuals’ support for 
government.
Drawing on research on political economy and economic voting, this article sheds 
light on the relationship between self-insurance and support for government. We 
propose that self-insurance could influence how citizens form economic perceptions, 
and subsequently how they evaluate the government to be performing. We antici-
pate that by increasing protection against economic risk and enabling households 
to smooth consumption in the event of an economic downturn, self-insurance could 
increase satisfaction with household finances and national economic conditions. 
1 We use the terms self-insurance, private safety nets and household economic buffers interchangeably. 
All these represent households’ ability to privately manage income and economic risks.
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Similarly, we anticipate that consistent with evidence that voter assessments of 
economic performance inform government approval and the vote, households with 
access to private safety nets could report improved assessments of government per-
formance. By relying on their pocketbooks to infer how the economy and by exten-
sion the national government are performing, however, voters may be crediting 
incumbents for their own decisions to manage economic uncertainty. This may be 
the case even in contexts where insurance markets, that could step in to compen-
sate for income loss and economic hardship, are incomplete (Carroll and Kimball 
2008; Carroll 1997), or where welfare markets are lacking all together (Gill and Ilahi 
2000). These propositions are consistent with evidence that in more and less demo-
cratic regimes, assessments of economic performance inform voter attitudes toward 
government and the vote more broadly (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2009; Tilley 
et al. 2018; Campello and Zucco 2015).
To empirically test our theoretical propositions, we draw on a wealth of cross-
sectional and panel datasets of approximately 40,000 respondents from 28 countries 
and combine them with data on national and regional growth and unemployment. 
The first part of the empirical analysis relies on cross-sectional survey data collected 
as part of the 2010 round of the Life in Transition survey (LITS II). This survey, 
commissioned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
was administered in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, shortly 
after the Great Recession (EBRD 2011). In a second step, we complement cross-
national evidence with rich panel data from Russia. The Russian Longitudinal Mon-
itoring survey (RLMS) tracks the same individuals over time and allows us to docu-
ment in greater detail how self-insurance affects economic perceptions (National 
Research University, NRU Higher School of Economics, HSE Demoscope et  al. 
2011). In repeated interviews, the RLMS collects information about citizens’ ability 
to weather the effects of economic and labour market insecurity and documents their 
evaluations of household and regional economic conditions.
To preview the results, we find robust effects of self-insurance on economic per-
ceptions and political support. Drawing on evidence from a period when many coun-
tries in Central-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia were still experienc-
ing the consequences of the Great Recession, the analysis shows that by offering 
households protection against economic risk and enabling them to smooth consump-
tion in the event of income loss, self-insurance may ameliorate economic assess-
ments and improve evaluations of government performance. As the analysis shows, 
the probability that households affected by the Great Recession would reduce con-
sumption or cut down on utility payments as a result of the downturn was approxi-
mately 70% lower among households with access to savings than among households 
also affected with the recession, but who lacked access to private safety nets. These 
results are shown to be robust to a broad range of empirical specifications. Moreo-
ver, to address concerns regarding the relationship between government support and 
access to self-insurance, we show that the political consequences of private safety 
nets are not limited to government supporters alone.
The article’s findings have important implications. Drawing on novel survey evi-
dence from a large sample of countries, our results engage with on-going debates 
regarding the political consequences of private safety nets whether remittances 
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(Doyle 2015; Ahmed 2017; Tertytchnaya et al. 2018) or religiosity (Popova 2014; 
Clark and Lelkes 2005), and extend the agenda to consider how self-insurance 
affects voters’ economic evaluations and political attitudes. Second, our findings 
contribute to a growing literature concerned with the effect of economic (in)secu-
rity on social policy preferences (Rehm et al. 2012; Hacker et al. 2013; Doyle 2015; 
Ansell 2014). The results reveal that in more and less liberal democracies, private 
safety nets have political ramifications beyond the realm of social policy. Third, our 
analysis speaks to a strand in the economic voting literature which underlines how 
cross-nationally, statist economic policy regimes and generous social security sys-
tems condition the effect of macroeconomic deterioration on turnout, government 
approval and the vote (Carlin and Hellwig 2015; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Singer 
2011). As we illustrate below, just like statist policy regimes have been found to pro-
tect voters from economic downturns, private safety nets can also ameliorate support 
for the government. Shedding light on the mechanisms through which self-insur-
ance influences political attitudes can also go a long way towards explaining why 
economic downturns may not always affect government approval, even in contexts 
where economic hardship is rife, and access to public safety nets is limited (e.g. 
Kriesi 2012; Hernandez and Kriesi 2015).
The Importance of Self‑Insurance
In economics and political science, the concept of self-insurance is often used to 
describe actions taken by individuals or households in order to reduce the size of 
economic uncertainty, or a potential income loss. The expectation is that households 
facing a situation of risk, such as loss of income, can redistribute income from a 
good state to a bad one (for example from employment to unemployment) as a form 
of assistance for possible ‘rainy days’ to come (Ehrlich and Becker 1972; Brooks 
2014). Self-insurance therefore encompasses private, i.e. household-based, or social 
safety nets, and stands in contrast to public safety nets, or state-provided social 
insurance.
Existing scholarship shows that self-insurance has important implications for 
household-level economic outcomes. Monetary and non-monetary support from 
friends and family at home and abroad (Harknett 2006; Doyle 2015), assets such 
as housing (Ansell 2014) and religious networks (Popova 2014; Clark and Lelkes 
2005), have been found to ameliorate household well-being, and increase protec-
tion against transitory income loss. In the political realm, self-insurance has been 
found to dampen individual-level demand for redistribution on the one hand, and 
aggregate-level social spending on the other (Doyle 2015; Ansell 2014). Moreover, 
recent research has documented a link between self-insurance and the decision to 
engage in politics. Drawing on empirical evidence from Brazil for example, Sarah 
Brooks (2014) has shown that citizens lacking the means to insure against liveli-
hood risks are more likely to shy away from active political engagement. Yet, we 
still know relatively little about how private safety nets affect not only what citizens 
want from government and how they express their grievances, but also how they 
evaluate government performance in the first place. By studying the individual-level 
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mechanisms that drive the connection between self-insurance and political support, 
this study hopes to expand our understanding.
At the aggregate level, comparative research advances the view that the ‘cushion’ 
provided by private safety nets has often ensured political stability in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America (e.g. Cheng and Gereffi 1994; 
Diaz 1993; Meagher 1995, Greskovits 1998). In recent years, Ahmed (2012, 2017) 
has provided compelling evidence that far from empowering political mobilization 
(De la Garza and Hazan 2003), private safety nets in the form of unearned foreign 
income can reduce government turnover. While this literature recognises self-insur-
ance effects on government stability, we still know relatively little about the micro-
level mechanisms that drive the political consequences of self-insurance and could 
influence the connection between household safety nets and political support.
Our work finally takes cue from studies showing that the importance of eco-
nomic dislocation in shaping political attitudes is not constant, but conditional on 
risk protection mechanisms. In the transition countries of Central-Eastern Europe, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, for example, religion, just like unearned income 
received from abroad have been found to buffer the well-being impact of economic 
reforms on political assessments (Popova 2014; Tertytchnaya et al. 2018). In West-
ern countries, employment protection legislation has also been shown to dampen 
the importance of individual-level risk in shaping policy preferences (Gingrich and 
Ansell 2012; Rehm et al. 2012). Similarly, statist policy regimes have been linked 
to whether people vote on the one hand, and to how they factor objective economic 
indicators in their vote calculus on the other (Carlin and Hellwig 2015; Pacek and 
Radcliff 1995; Singer 2011). We draw on these insights to explain how self-insur-
ance could influence voter perceptions of economic performance and evaluations of 
government performance. Governments’ approval function, existing research shows, 
serves as important proxy for a continual accountability mechanism in democracies 
(Carlin et  al. 2014; Carlin and Hellwig 2015) and non-democracies alike (Colton 
and Hale 2009; Frye et  al. 2017; Treisman 2011), shaping governments’ electoral 
strategies, legislative agendas and policy choices.
The Political Consequences of Self‑Insurance
We advance three claims. First, we argue that self-insurance influences how citizens 
form economic perceptions. Specifically, we expect that voters with access to private 
safety nets will report better assessments of household finances, or pocketbook eco-
nomic conditions than their counterparts, everything else equal. This is because pri-
vate safety nets offer households protection against economic risk and enable them 
to smooth consumption in the event of income loss. More specifically, we expect that 
by reducing household exposure to the vagaries of the business cycle, and allowing 
citizens to smooth consumption in the event of transitory income loss, private safety 
nets reduce economic insecurity—or the ‘psychologically mediated experience of 
inadequate protection against hardship-causing economic risks’ (Rehm et al. 2012; 
Hacker et al. 2014). Unemployment, or wage reductions for example, should be less 
feared when households know that in the event of a ‘rainy day’, they will be able to 
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either draw on existing savings, or that they will have access to help from friends 
and family (Carroll 1997). Similarly, during periods of transitory income loss pri-
vate safety nets could actively help households to smooth consumption (Ansell 
2014), and keep up with utility payments (Gill and Ilahi 2000).
Second, we suggest that the economic optimism self-insurance generates at the 
household level translates into more positive assessments of the state of the national 
economy. As existing literature reminds us, variation in personal economic circum-
stances often drives heterogeneity in perceptions of national economic performance. 
Individuals or groups experiencing economic hardship, for example, have been con-
sistently shown to report more pessimistic sociotropic evaluations than their coun-
terparts (Anderson 2007; Weatherford 1983). In conclusion, much like partisanship 
has been repeatedly shown to influence people’s economic evaluations (e.g. John-
ston 2006), we anticipate that self-insurance also influences the way citizens evalu-
ate macro-economic performance.
Finally, we expect that self-insurance may ameliorate evaluations of government. 
Concretely, we expect that individuals with access to risk-hedging assets, savings 
and networks will exhibit more favourable attitudes toward government relative to 
their counterparts, an effect that operates through improved economic assessments. 
Compared to their counterparts who lack access to means of self-insurance, more 
economically secure individuals are more likely to report positive evaluations of 
incumbent performance, even when the economy deteriorates. In this context, voters 
who rely on their pocketbook to infer how well or poorly the national economy and 
the incumbent are performing, may be crediting incumbents for their own house-
hold’s decision to manage economic risk and uncertainty. This could be true of vot-
ers even in countries where insurance markets are incomplete (Carroll and Kimball 
2008; Carroll 1997), or where state-provided social protection, in the form of unem-
ployment insurance for example, is lacking (Gill and Ilahi 2000). This proposition 
is in line with studies on economic voting. As existing research shows, in developed 
and developing economies, voters often rely on their pocketbooks to infer how the 
government, or the incumbent, are performing (Campello and Zucco 2015; Rosen-
feld 2018; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Healy and Malhotra 2012; Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2009; Tilley et  al. 2018). Finally, the argument is in line with recent 
scholarship on patrimonial voting, which argues that the possession of high- or low-
risk assets affects support for right and left-wing parties respectively (Nadeau et al. 
2011; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Persson and Martinsson 2016).
Yet, when voters infer that the national economy, and by extension the gov-
ernment, is performing well because they can buffer the effects of an ongoing 
downturn, accountability mechanisms could erode, especially in contexts we 
study here in which these mechanisms are rudimentary to begin with. Rewarding 
incumbents for household decisions to manage economic risk and uncertainty, or 
for adjusting monthly consumption habits so that it is possible to set money aside 
for a ‘rainy day’, may undermine the link between government action, voters and 
electoral sanctions (e.g. Campello and Zucco 2017). When a government enjoys 
high approval in the midst of an economic downturn, it may be less incentiv-
ized to invest in policies aimed at enhancing social welfare or providing social 
assistance to the most vulnerable (e.g. Tertytchnaya et al. 2018). Such a breach 
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in the accountability mechanism comes with important implications. As existing 
literature reminds us, in more and less liberal regimes, economic voting, i.e. vot-
ers’ ability to reward or punish incumbents on the basis of how well or poorly the 
economy is performing, is a key mechanism to ensure responsive and accountable 
governance (Campello and Zucco 2015; Stokes 2001).
It is worth briefly considering a number of potential qualifications to the argu-
ment we propose. To begin with, a note on the connection between wealth and 
self-insurance is warranted. Wealth, or the ownership of financial and non-finan-
cial assets, such as savings (a form of liquid assets) stocks, houses or land, may be 
considered as a particular sub-type of self-insurance. Ansell (2014) for example 
argues that homeownership acts as a form of self-insurance against the welfare 
losses associated with job loss, especially when access to credit may be curtailed. 
Assets may be converted into income through sale or by borrowing against them 
as collateral in order to smooth consumption (Ansell 2014; Nadeau et al. 2011). 
Yet, if individuals are unable to borrow against or sell any of the material assets 
they possess, such as their home for example, they do not see the realised value 
of those assets as self-insurance. In other words, assets are an economic buffer, or 
a means of self-insurance, for individuals who are able to either borrow against 
their assets or to sell them in order to receive consumption-smoothing income.
We also assume that access to self-insurance is not exclusively available to 
government supporters alone. Whether certain households across countries or 
sub-national units in the same country have access to various private safety nets, 
such as help from friends and relatives at home and abroad, while others do not, 
is an outcome that national governments do not fully control. Access to private 
safety nets does not necessarily dependent on citizens’ political affiliations, or 
pre-existing support for government. Similarly, means of private insurance are 
accessible to poorer and richer households alike. While the amount and value of 
certain private safety nets, such as savings, could be endogenous to individuals’ 
economic circumstances (Carroll and Kimball 2008), access to risk-insuring pri-
vate safety nets is largely independent of individuals’ temporary or labour mar-
ket income (e.g. Ansell 2014, p. 385). Existing research shows that measures of 
individual or household income do not necessarily capture households’ ability to 
buffer the effects of economic dislocation (Hacker et al. 2013). In line with exist-
ing literature in economics, we also acknowledge that the extent to which it can 
protect households from economic dislocation depends on various factors. The 
nature of the downturn the economy is facing is one of them. Household savings 
will better protect individuals from income loss when economic deterioration is 
not accompanied by high levels of inflation (e.g. Ansell 2014). But while some 
types of private safety nets, such as precautionary savings, decline as a function 
of the duration and size of economic shocks households experience, other forms 
of self-insurance, such as monetary assistance from friends or family at home 
and abroad, could in fact be counter-cyclical to individuals’ economic conditions. 
These propositions are well in line with the theoretical core of our argument. Yet, 
given that we propose a general argument on the political consequences of self-
insurance, investigating heterogeneity in types of private safety nets falls beyond 
the scope of this study.
 Political Behavior
1 3
Background and Case Selection
To test the proposition that self-insurance increases support for government, and 
that such an effect stems from an economic voting mechanism, we rely on evi-
dence from Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.2 Countries in the region were 
greatly affected by the Great Recession and provide a critical setting against which 
to explore the effects of private safety nets on political attitudes for several reasons.
First of all, self-insurance has been traditionally important in this part of the 
world. Focusing on Russia alone, Richard Rose and his co-authors for example, 
have shown that when the costs of economic transformation were at a peak in 1996, 
only 15% of Russians were relying solely on earnings from employment. This fig-
ure was no higher at the height of the economic boom a decade later (Rose et al. 
2011). Moreover, in the period preceding the Great Recession, revisions of growth 
projections and elevated uncertainty coincided with the increase in precautionary 
saving rates across the region. During the Great Recession, households in Central 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia extensively relied on private safety 
nets to weather the effects of income loss (ERBD 2011). Reliance on self-insurance 
resulted to a great extent from the fact that access to welfare provisions was limited 
for the majority of countries. The EBRD for example estimates that social assistance 
programs, income support and unemployment insurance covered just over 20% of 
all crisis-affected households in the region (ERBD 2011). Moreover, because of fis-
cal constraints, some governments had to implement measures that actually reduced, 
rather than increased unemployment insurance. Last Resort Social Assistance Pro-
grammes (LRSA), adopted in response to the downturn, only covered a small share 
of the population (World Bank 2011).
In terms of the empirical analysis, the fact that we focus on a period of economic 
contraction, helps us further isolate the political consequences of self-insurance. 
If we had tested how private safety nets influence economic and political assess-
ments during a period of growth, it would have been more difficult to disentangle 
whether the positive returns of self-insurance on approval were not the result of 
the government’s positive management of state finances. Around the Great Reces-
sion, however, households invested in self-insurance and accumulated precautionary 
savings largely because they were concerned about the looming economic down-
turn, not because economic performance was good. This is directly relevant to our 
analysis, which proposes that by reducing voters’ exposure to the vagaries of the 
business cycle, self-insurance colours economic, and by extension political assess-
ments. As countries in the region we focus on here were some of the worst hit by 
2 The analysis relies on evidence from the following countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Mol-
dova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan. These countries share the experience of post-Soviet transitions, but also present varia-
tion in terms of their political record. While in 2010 Estonia and Slovenia were well functioning liberal 
democracies for example, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia were two of all 47 countries in 
the world ranked ‘Not Free’ according to Freedom House.
1 3
Political Behavior 
the Great Recession, the case selection makes it particularly difficult to actually find 
that private safety nets influence economic and political evaluations. According to 
the World Bank for example, in 2009 Latvia’s annual GDP growth was negative, at 
− 14.25. As an influential literature shows, the salience voters attach to the economy 
closely tracks changing conditions. Economic downturns make citizens more apt to 
judge incumbents based on performance and to hold them accountable for failures 
(Singer 2011; Singer and Carlin 2013). When economic dislocation is rife, it is very 
difficult for citizens to ignore.
Empirical Results
In this section, we test our conjectures about the connection between self-insurance 
and support for government using cross-national survey data from the 2010 EBRD 
Life in Transition Survey (LITS II), and panel data from Russia. Summary statistics 
for the surveys used in this paper are provided in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.
Evidence from Cross‑National Survey Data
We begin by testing our conjectures about the political consequences of self-insur-
ance using cross-national survey data from the 2010 Life in Transition Survey. 
While most countries in Central-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
were still experiencing the aftershocks of the Great Recession, the ERBD admin-
istered an identical set of nationally representative surveys in many countries in the 
region. As the surveys were designed to capture the effects of the Great Recession, 
they include a very detailed set of questions that tap into people’s economic and 
political preferences. These survey items allows us to design well-specified models.
The empirical analysis presented below focuses on households across 28 coun-
tries included in the survey (see footnote 1) and captures access to self-insurance by 
a survey question asking if ‘at the end of a typical month, households have anything 
left over to put into savings’ (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0).3 We estimate the effect 
of self-insurance, which we proxy here with the help of the savings indicator, on 
economic assessments and evaluations of government performance. The two eco-
nomic variables we rely on ask respondents to evaluate whether on the whole, they 
are satisfied with their financial situation on the one hand, and with the present state 
of the economy on the other hand. Respondents are also asked to evaluate how the 
government is performing. All outcome variables are measured on a 5-point scale 
3 The question available in the Life in Transition surveys asks whether households have money to set 
aside, and how much money they set aside, not whether they place savings in a bank account alone. 
Indeed, only about 60% of households, who can set money aside, report to own a bank account. In Tables 
C3A, C3B and C3C in the Appendix we also probe the robustness of these results using quantiles of 
reported savings’ amounts instead.
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with higher values denoting greater satisfaction with economic conditions and gov-
ernment performance.4
In addition to standard demographic controls, such as age, gender, marital status, 
employment and education, models presented below control for household wealth. 
The wealth index considers whether households have access to tap water, elec-
tricity, fixed telephone line, central heating and to the internet, as well as whether 
households own a secondary residence, a car and a computer. The first set of items 
describe household characteristics, while the final three items capture durable assets. 
Combining these items, and employing Principal Component Analysis, we imple-
ment a weighting system for constructing the wealth index. From this, we extract 
the first component which we use for the analysis (e.g. Cordova 2009). Attitudes 
towards risk in general are also controlled for,5 as theories of choice under uncer-
tainty suggest that risk-acceptant individuals are more likely discount economic risk 
(e.g. Brooks 2014), and possibly less likely to insure.6 Finally, models control for 
country economic, and democratic performance. Economic performance data on 
economic growth (GDP growth, annual percentage for 2010) come from the World 
Bank, while the democratic performance indicator, also for 2010, comes from the 
Freedom House political rights index. This indicator, which ranges on a scale from 
1 to 40, assigns higher scores to more democratic countries, and captures whether 
there is political pluralism and participation in a country, as well as open and free 
private discussion (Freedom House 2010). Political pluralism and participation are 
of critical importance for enabling opposition forces and the media to articulate 
blame for an economic downturn.
The cross-national analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we investigate the effect 
of savings on household coping strategies in light of the recession. Second, we esti-
mate self-insurance effects on assessments of the economy and government per-
formance. Finally, to shed light on the full mechanism that links self-insurance to 
economic evaluations and from there to government approval, we employ a causal 
mediation framework (Becher and Donnelly 2013; Imai et al. 2010a, b; Rosenfeld 
2018). This approach allows us to explore how much of the total effect of self-insur-
ance on political assessments is mediated by economic evaluations. All models pre-
sented below use mixed effects regressions, suitable for multilevel data. Multilevel 
statistical techniques allow us to jointly model the macro-level and individual level 
determinants of household coping strategies, economic and political assessments, 
4 In Table C2 of the Appendix, we show that in line with the argument, savings also ameliorate trust in 
government, the parliament and the President.
5 The question which taps into people’s attitudes towards risk in the LITS survey presents respondents 
with a hypothetical scenario that is very well-suited to capturing attitudes towards risk, or propensity to 
save. More specifically, the surveys ask respondents to decide whether ‘if they had been a farmer, they 
would sell their car and buy an irrigation system that would protect their harvest in the case of a drought, 
or instead take the risk and hope there is no drought’.
6 All models are robust to the inclusion of controls for household income and crisis exposure. Please see 
Tables 3C in the Appendix. The income indicator asks respondents to place their households on a 10-step 
income scale, from poorer to richer. The risk exposure variable, which captures whether households were 
affected by the recession, is coded as (1) if households were to any extend affected by the economic 
downturn in the last 2 years, and (0) if they were not.
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and to estimate separate variance structures in order to produce unbiased standard 
errors. Moreover, country specific random intercepts help to reduce the threat of 
omitted variable bias from unobserved country characteristics.7
Self‑Insurance and Economic Assessments
Table 1 below investigates the micro-foundations of the proposition that self-insur-
ance ameliorates economic evaluations. It examines whether among those house-
holds negatively affected by the Great Recession of 2008–2010, savings’ holders 
were less likely to reduce consumption on the one hand, and delay payment on utili-
ties on the other. Overall, around 72% of all surveyed households report to have been 
to a various extent affected by the economic downturn. While existing literature pro-
poses that self-insurance enables households to smooth consumption during periods 
of transitory income loss, there are very few empirical tests of this hypothesis.
As we show in Table  1, holding everything else constant, the probability that 
households affected by the Great Recession will reduce consumption is 71% (95% 
CI −  0.79, −  0.64) lower among households with access to savings than among 
households also affected with the recession, but who lack access to savings. House-
holds with savings are also by 74% less likely to cut down on utility payments when 
compared to their counterparts (95% CI − 0.85, − 0.63). What is more, the ‘con-
sumption smoothing’ effect of self-insurance is robust to the inclusion of controls for 
individual-level wealth, and macro-level controls for economic, and democratic per-
formance. Overall, evidence provided in Table 1, provides support for the argument 
that self-insurance enables households negatively affected by an economic downturn 
to smooth consumption, and reduces exposure to the vagaries of the economy.
Table 2 takes the analysis a step further. Model 1 tests for the effect of savings on 
satisfaction with household economic conditions, and Model 2 tests for the effect of 
savings on satisfaction with national economic performance instead. In line with our 
expectations, the results in Table 2 illustrate that individuals who at the end of a typ-
ical month were able to set some money aside will, everything else equal, hold more 
favourable evaluations of household, and national economic performance. Self-
insurance effects are larger in Model 1, which considers satisfaction with household 
finances. Among respondents who could save, predicted satisfaction with household 
finances is around 3.1 (95% CI 2.98, 3.22), with the dependent variable measured on 
a 5-point scale. Predicted satisfaction with household finances is by 0.61 (95% CI 
0.58, 0.65) lower among respondents without access to savings. Such differences are 
less pronounced when we consider assessments of macro- economic performance. 
While predicted satisfaction among savings’ holders is around 2.66 (95% CI 2.56, 
2.76), satisfaction with economic performance is lower by 0.33 (95% CI 0.30, 0.37) 
among respondents without savings.
7 In Section C1 of the Appendix, we further show that the results remain robust when we use random 
slopes for savings. Random slopes allow us to account for the fact that the effect of self-insurance could 
vary across countries.
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Additional controls designed to capture the effect of household economic cir-
cumstances, and isolate the effect of savings on the outcome variables, also point 
to the direction theoretically anticipated. The wealth indicator has a direct and posi-
tive effect on assessments of household and national economic performance. And 
while the growth indicator fails to reach statistical levels of significance in Model 
1, it is positive and statistically significant in Model 2, which predicts assessments 
Table 1  Private safety nets 
enable households to smooth 
consumption. Source: LITS 
2010
Notes: Table entries are multilevel logit regression coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses. The sample is restricted to respond-
ents who were affected by the Great Recession, as only respondents 
who reported to be affected by the crisis were asked how they coped 
with its consequences
Significant at the , *p < 0.10, **p  < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 level
(1) (2)
Reduced consump-
tion
Cut down on utility 
payments
Has savings − 0.717*** − 0.741***
(0.041) (0.055)
Wealth index − 0.214*** − 0.070***
(0.013) (0.016)
Age 0.089*** − 0.208***
(0.018) (0.022)
Male − 0.091*** − 0.062
(0.032) (0.040)
Co-habiting − 0.026 0.008
(0.033) (0.041)
Education − 0.193*** − 0.178***
(0.028) (0.034)
Employed − 0.048 0.203***
(0.035) (0.043)
Risk acceptant − 0.012 − 0.047
(0.032) (0.040)
Growth − 0.057 − 0.058
(0.044) (0.038)
Democracy − 0.006 − 0.012
(0.010) (0.009)
Constant − 0.466*** − 1.745***
(0.101) (0.088)
Log Likelihood − 12,015.26 − 8679.486
AIC 24,054.53 17,382.97
BIC 24,149.24 17,477.68
Respondents 19,775 19,775
Countries 28 28
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of national economic conditions. As growth increases, evaluations of national eco-
nomic conditions also improve.
As already noted, a key assumption underlying our analysis is that self-insurance 
could increase economic optimism for both richer, and poorer households. Yet, one 
might still be concerned that self-insurance is only a proxy for higher household 
income. To address this concern, we probe the robustness of our results control-
ling for household income, as well as exposure to the Great Recession. The results, 
which we present in Tables C3 in the Appendix, remain consistent. Table D1.1 and 
Figure D1.1 in the Appendix also interact the measure of self-insurance available 
Table 2  Self-insurance effects 
on economic assessments. 
Source: LITS 2010
Notes: Table entries are multilevel regression coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses
Significant at the , *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 level
(1) (2)
Household economic 
satisfaction
National 
economic 
satisfaction
Has savings 0.615*** 0.334***
(0.018) (0.017)
Wealth index 0.101*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.006)
Age 0.011 − 0.011
(0.008) (0.008)
Male − 0.010 − 0.050***
(0.015) (0.014)
Co-habiting 0.036** − 0.030**
(0.015) (0.015)
Education 0.097*** − 0.007
(0.013) (0.012)
Employed 0.072*** − 0.022
(0.016) (0.015)
Risk acceptant 0.022 0.050***
(0.015) (0.014)
Growth 0.027 0.107***
(0.025) (0.022)
Democracy − 0.011* − 0.014***
(0.006) (0.005)
Constant 2.611*** 2.446***
(0.059) (0.051)
Log Likelihood − 28,266.22 − 27,252.04
AIC 56,558.45 54,530.09
BIC 56,661.02 54,632.68
Observations 19,742 19,767
Number of groups 28 28
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in the LITS surveys with the income indicator, while controlling for the individ-
ual and country-level covariates presented in Table 2. These results show that self-
insurance ameliorates economic assessments for poorer, and richer households alike. 
The effects are substantively important as they suggest that on average, self-insur-
ance makes poorer respondents as satisfied with household and national economic 
conditions as respondents who place themselves on the higher rung of the three-
step income category, yet lack access to savings. Additional tests presented in the 
Appendix (Section D2), further allow us to show that access to savings does not 
consistently predict the occurrence of labor market shocks. This is important, as one 
could argue that already vulnerable households, those who do not have access to 
self-insurance are the ones who experience labour-market shocks. These results are 
in line with the experience of the Great Recession across the region: during this 
period, even public-sector employees, who had stable jobs and higher income, were 
affected by fiscal constraints and saw their salaries decline. This was particularly the 
case in countries that had to implement public-sector reforms in an attempt to meet 
conditionality criteria imposed by the International Monetary Fund.
Self‑Insurance, Economic Assessments and Government Approval
Following up from the analysis presented in Table 2, the analysis in Table 3 tests 
for self-insurance effects on government approval. The dependent variable asks 
respondents to rate the overall performance of the national government, rang-
ing from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). While Model 1 documents self-insurance 
Table 3  Self-insurance, economic assessments, and government approval
Notes: Table entries are multilevel regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
Significant at the *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 level. Full results presented in Table  B1 of the 
Appendix
(1) (2) (3)
Without mediators Pocketbook mediator Sociotropic mediator
Has savings 0.132*** 0.030* 0.053***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Mediators 0.164*** 0.228***
(0.007) (0.007)
Demographic controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Country controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Constant 2.844*** 2.413*** 2.285***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.058)
Log Likelihood − 22,912.71 − 22,547.75 − 22,350.45
AIC 45,851.42 45,123.5 44,728.89
BIC 45,952.5 45,232.33 44,837.74
Individuals 17,594 17,557 17,585
Countries 28 28 28
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effects on government evaluations without considering the channels through which 
self-insurance effects are expected to operate, i.e., economic assessments, Models 2 
and 3 estimate the effect of self-insurance on support for government while control-
ling for economic optimism at the household, and national level respectively (the 
moderators). According to our theory, self-insurance could have a mediated effect 
on approval, and this effect would partly flow through assessments of economic 
performance.
Turning to Model 1, we see that holding everything else constant, government 
approval is by 0.13 points higher among individuals with access to savings than it is 
among their counterparts who lack access to self-insurance (95% CI 0.09, 0.16). For 
these two groups of respondents, predicted government approval hoovers well above 
average (around 2.8 and 2.9 respectively), with the dependent variable measured on 
a 5-point scale. Moving ahead, Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 suggests that self-insur-
ance effects on government approval remain robust, even after we control for each of 
the moderators, or channels, through which we would expect self-insurance effects 
on approval to operate, i.e. household and macro-economic optimism. As also antic-
ipated, although statistically significant, the coefficient of self-insurance on approval 
in Models 2 and 3 is significantly reduced. Model 2 suggests that when we control 
for the pocketbook mediator, government approval among savings’ holders is only 
by 0.03 greater than among respondents without access to savings. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 90 percent level. Model 3 similarly suggests that when 
we control for the sociotropic mediator, i.e. assessments of national economic per-
formance, government approval among savings’ holders is by 0.05 greater than it is 
among respondents without access to savings (0.05, 95% CI 0.02, 0.08). The reduc-
tion in the size of the savings’ coefficient in both models provides some preliminary 
support for the hypothesis that part of the total effect of self-insurance on approval 
operates through the economic assessments channel, and at a first step, validates the 
mediation mechanism. To test this in a more systematic way, we use a causal media-
tion framework.
Causal mediation analysis allows us to succinctly summarize evidence for the 
relationships implied in the theory regarding the effect of self-insurance on approval 
in terms of three types of effects: total effects, average direct effects, and aver-
age causal mediation effects. The total effect of self-insurance on approval can be 
decomposed into a direct, and a mediated effect. The direct effect of savings on 
evaluations of government performance tells us how much gaining access to sav-
ings would cause government approval to shift if assessments of national economic 
performance, the mediator, did not change. In other words, it captures the effect 
of self-insurance that does not flow through the economic optimism channel. The 
mediated effect represents the average change in evaluations of government, through 
the economic optimism channel, when access to savings, a proxy for self-insurance, 
changes. In this setup, we are substantively interested in the proportion of the total 
effect of savings on approval, that is mediated through the economic optimism chan-
nel. To estimate these quantities of interest, we use the algorithm specified by Imai 
et al. (2010a) and implemented in the R package mediation.
Figure  1 summarizes the results. The total effect of savings on government 
approval (ATE), is roughly equal to 0.13 (95% CI 0.09, 0.16). The direct effect of 
 Political Behavior
1 3
access to savings on approval, i.e. the effect that does not flow through the eco-
nomic optimism channel is also positive, and statistically significant at the 95% 
level (0.05, 95% CI 0.02, 0.09). The effect of self-insurance that flows through the 
economic optimism mechanism, i.e. the average causal mediation effect (ACME) 
is also positive, and statistically significant, at around 0.08 (95% CI 0.07, 0.09). 
What is more, the results from the mediation analysis suggest that the economic 
optimism mechanism accounts for as much as 60% (95% CI 0.47, 0.80), of the 
total effect of self-insurance on approval. This suggests that just over half of 
the total effect of self-insurance on evaluations of government operates through 
assessments of national economic performance.
Yet, we might be concerned that due to omitted variable bias, the results are 
driven by some other background characteristic of the individuals who can set 
money aside as savings, and which distinguishes them from individuals who can-
not self-insure in the first place. To address such concerns, Section D3 in the 
Appendix replicates the main findings reported in Tables 2 and 3 using a nearest-
neighbour matching technique (NN matching). By using matching, we are able to 
estimate the effect of savings on economic optimism and approval by accounting 
for the covariates the predict having savings in the first place (Rubin 1973), such 
as social-economic positioning, employment status, risk attitudes, level of educa-
tion, age and gender. Matching on these factors reduce threats to inference and 
reinforces confidence in our results. The results remain consistent. To summarize, 
the evidence presented thus far suggests that self-insurance increases economic 
optimism and ameliorates evaluations of government performance. By extension, 
it is possible to anticipate that in settings where a large part of the electorate can 
buffer the effects of economic dislocation, political support or evaluations of gov-
ernment performance would be less likely to decline as a result of an economic 
downturn.
Fig. 1  The political consequences of self-insurance: evidence from a causal mediation framework. Notes: 
The figure is based on Model 3, Table 3. It presents three types of estimates: the average total effect, the 
average direct effect (ADE) and the average causal mediation effect (ACME). The vertical lines are 95% 
confidence intervals
1 3
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Evidence from Russian Panel Data
To explore some of the individual-level mechanisms developed in the main part of 
the argument in greater detail, and examine whether self-insurance effects on eco-
nomic and political assessments hold when we consider types of self-insurance 
beyond savings, we turn to panel surveys from Russia. Survey evidence from Rus-
sia is comparatively rich and provides an unusual opportunity for further testing the 
mechanisms discussed in this paper in a illiberal context. What is more, reliance on 
private safety nets, such as networks of friends and family, land produce and bar-
ter has been traditionally very important in Russia (Rose et al. 2011). Russia also 
represents a classic example of hybrid, or competitive authoritarian regime, featur-
ing the co-existence of legitimate and public competition with an organization and 
institutional field that renders this competition unfair (Magaloni 2006; Frye et  al. 
2017). Thus, in examining the Russian case in more detail, we can also delve deeper 
into the individual-level mechanisms that link self-insurance, economic and politi-
cal assessments outside of democracies. Evidence employed for this second part 
of the analysis comes from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
(National Research University, NRU Higher School of Economics, HSE Demoscope 
et al. 2011). The dataset we employ here consists of four consecutive waves of sur-
veys that span the period 2009–2012.
In repeated time-points, the RLMS questionnaire asks respondents to assess ‘how 
long they think that they could live at the present level, without decreasing their 
expenditures and without any income, in the unpleasant situation in which all fam-
ily members lost their income’. This question taps into respondents’ own estimates 
of how long their household could get by, without earnings, if their current sav-
ings stopped. While this is a composite of objective access to private-safety nets 
and subjective assessments of their ability to weather an economic downturn (which 
could create noise in the measure) it is a measure extensively used in existing lit-
erature (e.g. Hacker et al. 2013). As an indicator of household economic buffers the 
measure the RLMS provides us with is broader than single-measure indicators (be 
it household access to savings and/or specific household assets) and captures house-
holds’ ability to weather the effects of economic shocks by relying on a wide variety 
of risk-hedging assets. Concretely, respondents are invited to assess whether they 
could get by from less than a day to up to half a year. We recode this variable into 
a dummy. Coded as (1) are individuals who could get by for a month or more, and 
coded as (0) are those individuals who could only get by for less than a month.8 This 
measure is close to the 3-month threshold employed in comparative literature on the 
political consequences of self-insurance in the United States, yet the main results do 
not change if a continuous measure, which ranges from less than a week (1) to over 
a year (6) is used instead.
To examine how this measure of self-insurance relates to economic optimism, we 
rely on two additional measures that capture satisfaction with economic performance 
8 See for example Hacker et al. (2014, S9) who show that the loss of three months of income (i.e. 25% of 
annual income loss) is expected to cause hardship for at least half of Americans.
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at the household and macro-economic levels. The first dependent variable is meas-
ured on a 5-point scale with higher values denoting more favourable assessments of 
household economic conditions. The second dependent variable relies on a survey 
item exclusively available in the 19th wave of the RLMS that was administered in 
2010, and which asks individuals to assess, ‘by their opinion, what is the percentage 
of unemployed people in their region’. This is a measure that has been previously 
used in influential studies of economic voting as a proxy of households’ economic 
assessments (Ansolabehere et  al. 2014). We use this item as an indicator of eco-
nomic evaluations in general, and are not interested in individual deviations from 
the real unemployment rate in one’s regions, or in whether citizens offer an accurate 
estimate of the unemployment rate. Consistent with existing literature, we interpret 
higher unemployment estimates to indicate that respondents are more concerned 
about how the economy is performing in their region.
As with the LITS surveys, the analysis relies on mixed effects linear models, with 
individuals clustered within household/years (Models 1 and 2), or just households 
(Models 3 and 4). In the case of household satisfaction, controls for previous-year 
satisfaction with household conditions.9 We do not lag the dependent variable when 
considering assessments of the unemployment rate, the sociotropic variable, as this 
item is only asked in a single year. In terms of demographic controls, we include an 
economic shock indicator that invites respondents to report whether they saw their 
working hours, or salary decline. We code this variable as (1) if respondents expe-
rienced the shock and (0) if otherwise. As the risk-exposure indicator is specific to 
work-force individuals, these models do not control for respondents’ employment 
status. Table A2 in the Appendix provides summary statistics.
By controlling for previous-year economic satisfaction, Models 1 and 2 in 
Table  4 examine changes in people’s satisfaction with household economic con-
ditions, rather than absolute satisfaction. Model 1 in Table  4 uses a dichotomous 
measure of self-insurance, while Model 2 estimates the same, using a continuous 
measure instead. Models 3 and 4 respectively, which estimate self-insurance effects 
on subjective assessments of the regional unemployment rate, also control for the 
regional unemployment rate in respondents’ regions. This indicator comes from 
Russia’s Federal State Statistical Service (ROSSTAT). Evidence provided below 
suggests that individuals who were able to ‘get by’ for a longer period of time, con-
sistently reported greater levels of economic satisfaction on the one hand, and lower 
estimates of the unemployment rate on the other. Turning to the last set of models 
for example, we see that the regional unemployment estimate of an individual who 
can ‘get by’ for one month or more is by 2 percentage points lower than that of their 
counterpart, who is only able to get by for less than a month, everything else equal.
Across all models, the experience of household economic shocks has the opposite 
effect of that of self-insurance. Cuts in respondents’ salary, or working hours are 
9 As we show in the Appendix., Table C1.2, the analysis also remains robust to the inclusion of random 
slopes for self-insurance and economic shocks. Table C1.3 shows that results presented in Models 1 and 
2 below are robust to the inclusion of wave fixed-effects. Self-insurance effects on household, and macro-
economic assessments are finally robust to matching (Table D3.2).
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robustly associated with more negative assessments of household economic condi-
tions, and more pessimistic assessments of the regional unemployment rate. This 
implies that even in an illiberal political environment, as the one Russia featured 
this period, personal experiences of economic loss, could successfully translate into 
economically meaningful attitudes, and influence assessments of regional economic 
performance. Income, a classic predictor of economic evaluations and unemploy-
ment estimates in established democracies (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2014), fails to 
reach statistical levels of significance in both Models 3 and 4. This dovetails with 
existing research suggesting that outside of established democracies, individual 
Table 4  Self-insurance and economic optimism: evidence from panel surveys in Russia. Source: Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 2009–2012
Notes: Table entries are multilevel regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Significant 
at the , *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household economic assessments 
(2009–2012)
Unemployment estimate 
(2010)
Self-insurance (dummy) 0.304*** − 2.284***
(0.015) (0.593)
Self-insurance (continuous) 0.135*** − 0.906***
(0.005) (0.215)
Economic assessments (lag) 0.283*** 0.276***
(0.006) (0.006)
Salary, hours reduced − 0.206*** − 0.201*** 2.029** 1.999**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.840) (0.840)
Household income (log) 0.259*** 0.246*** − 0.144 − 0.095
(0.011) (0.011) (0.460) (0.461)
Age 0.000 − 0.000 0.011 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.019) (0.019)
Male 0.056*** 0.053*** − 3.102*** − 3.094***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.394) (0.394)
Education 0.074*** 0.069*** − 2.013*** − 1.988***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.411) (0.411)
Co-habiting − 0.001 0.001 0.123 0.112
(0.016) (0.016) (0.592) (0.591)
Regional unemployment 0.821*** 0.813***
(0.129) (0.129)
Constant 1.553*** 1.278*** 32.633*** 34.457***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.478) (0.818)
Log Likelihood − 32,785.74 − 32,687.43 − 18,079.46 − 18,078.05
AIC 65,593.47 65,396.86 36,180.92 36,178.09
BIC 65,682.16 65,485.56 36,251.08 36,248.25
Individuals 23,458 23,458 4351 4351
Households*Years 14,591 14,591 3010 3010
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heterogeneity in economic perceptions and political attitudes could be driven more 
by patterns of economic (in)security rather than economic disadvantage, as tradi-
tionally proxied by income (see also Brooks 2014).
Overall, results regarding self-insurance effects on economic optimism are con-
sistent with cross-sectional evidence from the 2010 LITS surveys and in line with 
our theoretical propositions. They suggest that in Russia, just like in the rest of the 
region, the availability of a more robust portfolio of economic assets is robustly 
associated with economic optimism.10
Alternative Explanations
In this study, we have theoretically argued and empirically substantiated that pri-
vate safety nets ameliorate government approval, and that a large part of this effect 
operates through the economic optimism channel. Yet, in many countries in Cen-
tral-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia clientelism and corruption are 
rife. If incumbent supporters are the only ones with access to private safety nets 
(either because they are more well connected, or because they are more likely to 
receive handouts) the relationship between private safety nets and approval could be 
spurious. Similarly, one may be concerned that self-insurance ameliorates political 
support among only for voters who supported the government in the first place. To 
alleviate such concerns to the best of our ability, we turn to new datasets, and per-
form additional analysis. We introduce our findings below and present the results in 
Section E of the Appendix.
First, we show that controlling for risk exposure and economic performance, self-
insurance generates economic optimism and ameliorates government approval for 
voters who support the party in power and those who do not. As neither of the sur-
veys examined so far included items that tap into respondents’ partisanship, or affili-
ations towards the regime, we rely on a third unusually large dataset from Russia. 
The Russian Public Opinion Foundation Survey (FOM) of February 2011 (VCIOM 
2011) comprises of a regionally, and nationally representative sample of over 50,000 
respondents who were asked a range of opinion questions on economic and political 
issues. Just like the Life in Transition Surveys this survey includes a question that 
asks whether households have any savings, monetary or otherwise, but also includes 
an item tapping into respondents’ vote intention. More specifically, respondents are 
asked to report ‘whom they would vote for if a Parliamentary election was to be held 
this upcoming Sunday’. We recode this vote intention variable into a dummy that 
takes the value of (1) if respondents would vote for the United Russia, the ruling 
regime party, and (0) if they would not. In doing so, we investigate whether self-
insurance ameliorates economic and political assessments for both pro-government 
and opposition supporters. Overall, the analysis presented in Table E1 in the Appen-
dix suggests that savings’ holders are more likely to be satisfied with economic 
10 Table C1.2 in Section C of the Appendix shows that the results are robust when we use random slopes 
for self-insurance and crisis exposure. Table D3.2 shows that findings are robust to matching.
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performance in their region, and to approve of Vladimir Putin’s performance, 
regardless of whether they would support the party of power in upcoming elections 
or not. These results, we also show in Table E1B, are robust to nearest-neighbour 
matching. In sum, self-insurance colours economic and political assessments, and 
these effects hold for ruling party supporters, and the rest of the electorate.
To address concerns related specifically to clientelism, and self-insurance accu-
mulated through vote-buying, Tables E2 and E3 in the Appendix presents the fol-
lowing analyses. First, and drawing on evidence documenting that vote-buying is 
greater in least democratic regions, we replicate the cross-sectional analysis by 
interacting the savings and democratic performance indicators. Results presented 
in Table E2 and Figure E1 in the Appendix suggest that self-insurance effects on 
approval differ very little across more or less liberal democracies. This finding sug-
gests that in line with an economic voting mechanism, self-insurance encourages 
economic optimism and ameliorates approval across political systems and is in line 
existing literature documenting economic voting effects in democracies and autoc-
racies (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008; Rosenfeld 2018; Chaisty and Whitefield 
2012). Finally, we test for self-insurance effects on turnout. If households are able to 
set money aside because they receive handouts, or government payments in the form 
of positive inducements in order to vote, then they should also be more likely to 
report that they have turned out to vote for the parties who bought them off. Cross-
sectional analysis from the Life in Transition surveys presented in Table E3 of the 
Appendix provides evidence against this hypothesis. Being able to set money aside 
does not predict higher turnout, as the self-insurance coefficient is negative and fails 
to reach statistical levels of significance. Altogether, these findings do not seem in 
line with the argument that private safety nets result from clientelistic or vote-buy-
ing exchanges alone, and challenge the assumption that private safety nets matter 
only for ruling-party supporters.
Conclusion
Understanding which factors dampen citizens’ ability to hold governments to 
account, especially during periods of macro-economic downturns, is a key question 
for scholars of elections. Using rich cross-sectional from 28 countries in Europe, the 
Caucasus, and combining it with panel data from Russia, we have examined how 
private safety nets affect economic and political assessments. Our results suggest 
that by allowing households to buffer against economic downturns, private safety 
nets systematically affect economic optimism and political support. These effects, 
which are robust when we control for household risk exposure, as well as country-
level economic and democratic performance, suggest that self-insurance could at 
times help ill-performing incumbents escape blame for macro-economic dislocation.
Our findings speak to several literatures. Findings presented here reveal that self-
insurance has broad political ramifications, beyond the realm of social policy, and 
across more and less liberal regimes. In line with recent contributions in the eco-
nomic voting literature (e.g. Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012; Zucco 2013; Tilley 
et al. 2018), we have demonstrated that pocketbook assessments affect how citizens 
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make sense of government performance. Results also contribute to debates of how 
private safety nets affect governance in illiberal democracies. By documenting self-
insurance effects on government approval across a range of liberal and illiberal 
democracies, we offer a an important individual-level explanation of how private 
safety nets, be it in the form of savings, or help from friends and relatives, could 
help extend government tenure (Ahmed 2012). More specifically, findings suggest 
that self-insurance could extend tenure not only by dampening demand for redistri-
bution, but also by ameliorating government approval, even when economic perfor-
mance is poor. Finally, evidence that private safety nets could aid incumbents has 
important implications for understanding governments’ decision to promote policies 
and adopt rhetoric that encourage households to accumulate precautionary savings. 
Such policies, coinciding at times with serious cutbacks in state welfare spending, 
could possibly diminish electoral punishment. Exploring how government policies 
that encourage self-insurance affect saving decisions and the economic vote across 
more and less liberal democracies constitutes a fruitful avenue for future research.
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